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Mass Immunization Cases: Drug Manufacturers'
Liability for Failure to Warn*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the manufacturers of polio' vaccines, administered in mass immunization programs at public health clinics, have
been beseiged with a flurry of cases in which they have been held
liable for failing adequately to warn of the dangers inherent in the
use of an otherwise pure, unadulterated drug. 2 As a result of the
relatively large judgments awarded in these cases3 and the almost
insurmountable practical problems of preventing further liability,
drug manufacturers have ceased, or are threatening to cease, production of these essential, life-saving vaccines.4 Consequently, these
recoveries threaten the effectiveness of the nation's preventative
health care programs and contravene the strong public policy of
combatting infectious disease through widespread vaccination campaigns.5 Furthermore, as community health care centers increase in
number and expand in function to meet the emerging needs of the
nation's medical patients, the drug manufacturer's potential liability is multiplied. In addition, although the scenario for most of the
* The author wishes to express appreciation to Hugh Nilsen Smith, Esquire, and Dr.
William Schaffner for their assistance in the preparation of this Note.
1. "Poliomyelitis" and "polio," a popular name for poliomyelitis, will be used synonymously and interchangably throughout this Note.
2. For the purposes of this Note, vaccines will be referred to as "drugs." The medical
profession, however, generally refers to vaccines as "biologics."
3. See, e.g., Givens v. Lederle, Docket No. 73-59-CIVTK (S.D. Fla. 1975) ($262,000
awarded to plaintiff for injuries resulting from contact with child who had received defendant's oral Sabin polio vaccine); Tinnerholm v. Parke-Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), afl'd, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969) ($651,783.52 awarded to parents of child
for injuries resulting from administration of quadrigen vaccine); Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis
& Co., 257 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.D. 1966), aff'd, 441 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969) ($500,000 awarded
in quadrigen case).
4. Bad Omen for U.S. Vaccine Supplies, MED. WORLD NEWS, Sept. 8, 1975, at 75. See
also Curran, Immunization Programs:FurtherLegal Developments, 59 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH
349 (Feb. 1969) (predicting the discouragement of private drug concerns from entering certain
preventative medicine immunization fields).
5. See discussion of amici curiae briefs filed by the American Academy of Pediatrics
and the Conference of State and Territorial Epidemiologists in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,
498 F.2d 1264, 1293 (5th Cir.}, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974); see text accompanying note
179 infra.
6. See generally Comment, Drug Manufacturers,Public Clinics and the Duty to Warn,
56 GEo. L.J. 1016-17, 1022 (1968). The author notes that while medical practice in the U.S.
increasingly is becoming a public function through the use of public health clinics, these
clinics can provide only impersonal mass treatment to the client. Id. at 1016-17. Community
health care centers, however, are essential to serve the poor, disabled, chronically ill, aged,
industrial workers, mothers, and children. Id. at 1017 n.2, citing NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
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mass immunization cases thus far has been the administration of
polio vaccine at a public health clinic, the holdings foreshadow the
extension of their rationale to other immunization agents or drugs
distributed at a clinic, or at any in-patient or out-patient facility,
in an impersonal "assembly-line" fashion in which nurses perform
important dispensing functions without direct physician supervision.7
Because the primary "mass immunization" cases have involved
the imposition of liability for injuries resulting from the administration of a polio vaccine," this Note initially will discuss the history
of the development of this vaccine to provide a more complete understanding of the factual background surrounding these cases. The
holdings of the "mass immunization" cases and the rationales proffered to support the imposition of liability on the drug manufacturers will be examined. Further, this Note will investigate in depth the
practical problems faced by drug manufacturers because of these
cases and, lastly, will propose possible solutions to those problems.
II.

HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLIO VACCINE

For an adequate understanding of the mass immunization
cases, the history of the development of the polio vaccine must be
examined.' Prior to 1950, the dread disease of poliomyelitis was a
major crippler of children in the United States and throughout the
world."0 In 1952 alone, 57,879 cases of polio were reported in the
United States, of which 21,269 cases resulted in crippling paralysis
to the victims." By 1971, the number of reported cases of poliomyeCOMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON HEALTH CARE FACILITIES 36

(1967)
and Metzler, Public Health in a Troubled World, 56 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 161, 164 (1966).
7. Curran, Public Warningsof the Risk in OralPolio Vaccine, 65 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH
501 (May 1975); cf., note 140 infra and accompanying text.
8. Although many other vaccines are marketed and used throughout the United States
today, including diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, influenza, measles, rabies, and rubella vaccines, few cases have been brought for injuries sustained therefrom. The reasons probably are
twofold: the risk associated with the vaccine is well known, as with the rabies vaccine; or,
the harmful effects of the vaccine or disease generally are not very serious, as with the measles
vaccine. Perhaps the recently developed rubella vaccine, which may cause serious harm to
an unborn fetus if the vaccine is administered to a pregnant mother, may be the exception.
The public health clinics and physicians, however, have engaged in a careful screening process to combat this risk.
9. See generally A. KLEIN, TRIAL BY FURY (1972) [hereinafter cited as KLEIN]; J. PAUL,
A HISTORY OF POLIOMYELITIS (1971) [hereinafter cited as PAUL]; J.R. WILSON, MARGIN OF

SAFETY (1963).
10. Griffin v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 10, 23 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified, 353 F. Supp.
324 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974); PAUL, supra note 9, at 468.
11. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1269 (5th Cir. 1974).
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litis was reduced to nineteen, 2 primarily due to the development of
an effective vaccine to combat the disease.
It was not until about 1950 that scientists really began to understand how poliomyelitis attacks its victims.' 3 Scientists discovered
that polio is caused by an enterovirus that is introduced into the
body orally and begins to reproduce rapidly in the intestinal tract."
At this point the disease is termed an "infection" to which over
eighty percent of the population has acquired immunity,' 5 and from
which only about one per cent will manifest clinical symptoms of
poliomyelitis.' 6 When the disease does result, it is caused by a
spread of the virus from the intestinal tract to the spinal column,
where it will cause damage to the nervous system, which results in
the characteristic muscular paralysis."
The initial breakthrough for scientists studying the disease was
the discovery that only three types of the virus existed-Type I,
Type H, and Type III-in contrast to the enormous number of types
that exist for most viruses.'" To provide protection, a vaccination
would have to immunize the vaccinee against all three types of
virus.'9 The first effective vaccine to be perfected was a killed virus
vaccine developed by Dr. Jonas Salk.20 A killed virus vaccine is
produced by growing virus in a tissue culture and killing it chemically to render it incapable of causing disease, but capable of acting
as an antigen to stimulate the production of antibodies." Then, if a
wild or virulent strain of polio virus enters the body, the antibodies
will destroy the live virus and prevent the contraction of polio. 22 In

1955, after extensive testing, the Salk vaccine was released for general use. The vaccine was determined to be completely safe unless
it inadvertently contained some unkilled virulent strains of the
12.

CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, POLIOMYELITIS SURVEILLANCE, ANNUAL SUMMARY 1972,

App., (Oct. 1974); see Horstmann, EnterovirusInfections of the CentralNervous System, 51
MED. CLINICS OF No. AM. 681 (May 1967) (Dr. Horstmann discusses the decline in the incidence of poliomyelitis throughout the world).
13. 498 F.2d at 1295.
14. Id.; Griffin v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 10, 23 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
15. Many cases of poliomyelitis do not result in paralysis of the limbs or breathing
muscles. Some are mild, with no more symptoms than a cold, perhaps accompanied by a little
stiffness in the neck. 2 SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, at P-121 (1915).
16. 498 F.2d at 1296.
17. Id.; 351 F. Supp. at 23.
18. 498 F.2d at 1296; 351 F. Supp. at 23. See also Sabin, Oral Poliovirus Vaccine, 194
J.A.M.A. 872, 873 (1965).
19. 498 F.2d at 1296.
20. 351 F. Supp. at 23.
21. Id. at 23-24; 498 F.2d at 1296.
22. 498 F.2d at 1296; 351 F. Supp. at 24.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:235

virus, as happened in the "Cutter incident" of 19 5 5 ,23 from which a
total of 207 vaccine-associated cases occurred. 24 Although the Salk
vaccine became the primary weapon against polio, it had certain
drawbacks that made it less than the ideal vaccine for the nationwide immunization against polio, a disease which struck hardest in
the lower socio-economic groups. First, to remain effective the Salk
vaccine required three separate hypodermic injections followed by
booster shots every few years. Secondly, it did not immunize the
intestinal tract against infection, so that vaccinees still could pass
the virus to non-immune persons with whom they came in contact.2 5
Consequently, an effort was made to develop a vaccine that could
be distributed more easily, that could provide intestinal immunity,
and that could afford permanent immunity that would make
2
booster shots unnecessary.
In the late 1950's, after many years of work, Dr. Albert Sabin
developed an oral vaccine consisting of living but attenuated virus
particles. These virus particles were rendered incapable of producing disease by extensive laboratory processes, but were sufficiently
strong to cause the production of antibodies in the recipient's system.Y Three types of "monovalent" vaccines were produced to combat each type of polio virus, as well as a "trivalent" vaccine to
combat all three types.2s After three years of extensive internationally cooperative studies and tests, the vaccine was licensed for sale
and distribution as a prescription drug in the United States in
1960.9
Concurrently, in the fall of 1960, an advisory committee was
established by the Surgeon General of the United States to review
all phases of polio prevention. In February 1962 the Communicable
Disease Center0 of the United States Public Health Service, of the
23. The "Cutter incident" refers to an outbreak of poliomyelitis that resulted from
innoculations with the Salk killed virus vaccine, manufacturered by Cutter laboratories,
which inadvertentently contained some live virus particles. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498
F.2d 1264, 1296 (5th Cir. 1974). For a discussion of the "Cutter incident," see PAUL, supra
note 9, at 437-39; KLEIN, supra note 9, at 11-25, 149-50. See also 13 STAN. L. Rav. 645 (1961),
discussing the case of Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr.
320 (1960), which resulted from this mishap.
24. PAUL, supra note 9, at 437.
25. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1296 (5th Cir. 1974); Griffin v. United
States, 351 F. Supp. 10, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1972); PAUL, supra note 9, at 451.
26. 351 F. Supp. at 24.
27. 498 F.2d at 1296.
28. Id.
29. Sabin, supra note 18, at 874. See also Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121,
122 (9th Cir. 1968).
30. The Communicable Disease Center is now called the Center for Disease Control.
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Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, recommended a
mass immunization campaign to eliminate completely paralytic
poliomyelitis from the United States. 1 Accordingly, mass
immunization centers were established throughout the United
States, and many states enacted statutes requiring all children to
be immunized before entering elementary school. 32 Nevertheless,
despite the years of testing and the general recognition that the
Sabin oral vaccine was safe and effective, by August 1962, evidence
came to light of a number of cases of poliomyelitis occurring within
thirty days of immunization with the live attenuated virus.33 In
response to this evidence, the Public Health Service set up a committee to investigate the matter. The Special Advisory Committee
studied these cases extensively and in its 1964 Report reached the
following conclusion:
The Committee recognizes that it is not possible to prove that any individual
case was caused by the vaccines and that no laboratory tests required can
provide a definitive answer. Nevertheless, considering the epidemiological evidence developed with respect to the total group of compatible cases, the
Committee believes that at least some of these cases were caused by the vaccine.31

The Committee then attempted to estimate the extent of the risk
inherent in the vaccine from the incidence rates per million doses
of the vaccine that had been distributed for use: for Type I, 0.16 per
million doses; for Type II, 0.02 per million doses; for Type 111, 0.40
per million doses. 5 Although the Committee recommended that the
31.
32.

399 F.2d at 123.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT.

(1) ...

ANN.

§ 232.032 (Cum. Supp. 1975), which provides in part:

Immunizations shall be required for poliomyelitis, smallpox, diphtheria, ru-

beola, rubella, pertussis, and tetanus .....

The manner and frequency of administra-

tion of the immunization or testing shall conform to recognized standards of medical
practice. The division of health shall supervise and secure the enforcement of the re-

quired immunization.
(2) The school board of each district . . . shall require each pupil who is otherwise
entitled to admittance to kindergarten or first grade, . . . to present a certification of
immunization for the prevention of those communicable diseases for which immunization is required by the division of health.
(3) The provisions of this section shall not apply if:
(a) The parent or guardian of the child objects in writing that the administration of immunizing agents conflicts with his religious tenets or practices, or
(b) A competent medical authority certifies in writing that the child should
be exempt from the required immunization for medical reasons, or
(c) The division of health determines that according to recognized standards
of medical practice any required immunization is unnecessary or hazardous.
33. PAUL, supra note 9, at 465.
34. SPECIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ORAL PoLIOMYELITIs VACCINE, REPORT TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, at 5 (1964) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
35. Id.
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nonepidemic use of Type IlI oral vaccine be restricted to children,"6
it re-emphasized the need to continue the mass immunization programs in full force.3 7 It is noteworthy, however, that Dr. Albert
Sabin, a member of the Committee, filed a dissenting report in
which he basically contended that the Committee's findings regarding vaccine-associated cases of poliomyelitis were not supported by
an examination of the cases and the corresponding statistical data."
Nevertheless, despite the controversy over the risks associated with
the Sabin oral vaccine among scientific and medical circles, the
courts generally have accepted the proposition that poliomyelitis
may be induced by the ingestion of the oral vaccine.39 This finding
ultimately has led to the imposition of liability on the vaccine manufacturers for failing adequately to warn the consuming public of
these risks.
Ill.

LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURER

Prior to an examination of the case law imposing liability on
vaccine manufacturers, a distinction must be drawn between two
types of drugs that may cause injury to the user 4°-pure and impure
drugs. Impure drugs exist in a condition, or are used in a manner,
other than that intended by the manufacturer, and cause harm to
the user because of the presence of certain foreign substances, or
because of their improper labeling or directions for use.' In such
cases, the plaintiff ordinarily can prove negligence on the part of the
manufacturer." Pure drugs, on the other hand, exist in a condition
and are used in a manner intended by the manufacturer, but cause
harm as a side effect because of some inherent quality of the drug
36. Id. at 6; see Henderson, White, Morris & Langmuir, ParalyticDisease Associated
with Oral Polio Vaccines, 190 J.A.M.A. 41 (1964).
37. REPORT, supra note 34, at 6.
38. REPORT, supra note 34, Comments by Albert B. Sabin, M.D. See also Sabin,
Vaccine-associated Poliomyelitis Cases, 40 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 947 (1969); Sabin,
Commentary on Report on Oral Poliomyelitis Vaccines, 190 J.A.M.A. 52 (1964); Sabin, Is
There an Exceedingly Small Risk Associated with OralPoliovirusVaccine?, 183 J.A.M.A. 268
(1963) (Dr. Sabin points out that in recent years certain Coxsackie A, Coxsackie B, ECHO,
and even mumps viruses have been proved to cause paralytic illnesses, indistinguishable from
the clinical spectrum of paralytic poliomyelitis).
39. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1297 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis
v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121, 124-25 (9th Cir. 1968).
40. See Rheingold, ProductsLiability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturer'sLiability, 18
RUTCERS L. REv. 947 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Rheingold], citing U.S. Public Health
Service estimates that approximately 1.3 million drug reactions occur annually, requiring
medical attention or resulting in lost work.
41. Id. at 970-71.
42. See notes 62-64 infra and accompanying text.
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itself, or because of some physiological peculiarity of the user.43 All
prescription drugs can cause some side effects," and, inevitably,
some users will experience an adverse reaction to a drug regardless
of its harmless appearance or composition. For example, more than
twenty persons die annually from the use of aspirin." Additionally,
because of the almost indefinite number and variety of idiosyncratic, allergic, and hypersensitive users, drug reactions never are
entirely predictable.4 6 Thus given these two factors and the present
state of medical knowledge, unavoidable injuries may occur from
unadulterated drug, despite all due care by the manuuse of a pure,
47
facturer.
Because of the inherent risks associated with any drug, federal
control has become essential for adequate public protection.48 After
extensive and carefully regulated premarket testing and analysis,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determines which drugs
are "safe for use" by balancing the potential risks with the therapeutic benefits sought to be achieved through use of the drug." The
FDA also regulates the manner in which a drug will be promoted
and sold, and prescribes the labeling requirements, which typically
emphasize precautions, side effects, and hazards associated with
the drug. 0
Although drug manufacturers are required to obtain FDA approval before marketing a new drug, compliance with FDA regulations does not fully protect a manufacturer. 1 Rather, the majority
of courts have held that these regulations create only a minimal
standard, and that compliance therewith merely is evidence of due
43. Rheingold, note 40 supra, at 970.
44. Peterson, ProductsLiabilityof Drug Manufacturers,16 DEFENSE L.J. 277, 285 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Peterson].
45. Id.
46. Id. at 286. See also, Merrill, Compensationfor PrescriptionDrugInjuries, 59 VA.
L. REv. 1, at 24-25 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Merrill]; Teff, Products Liability in the
PharamaceuticalIndustry at Common Law, 20 McGiLL L.J. 102 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Teff], noting that drugs may also produce synergistic effects when taken in combination with
other substances, such as alcohol or barbituates.
47. See Peterson, supra note 44, at 286; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toirrs § 402A,
comment k at 353-54 (1965).
48. Elser, Medical Products-An Area of Growing Concern, 1974 INS. L.J. 539
[hereinafter cited as Elser].
49. Elser, supra note 48, at 539; Merrill, supra note 46, at 8-9. For vaccines, this function has been delegated to the Division of Biologic Standards (D.B.S.), which is a subdivision
of the National Institutes of Health of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Griffin v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 10, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
50. Elser, supra note 48, at 539; Merrill, supra note 46, at 11.
51. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23
S.W.L.J. 256, 286 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Noel].
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care. 52 Contrariwise, however, is the decision in Lewis v. Baker,5*in
which the court held that a drug properly tested, labeled with appropriate warnings, approved by the FDA, and marketed under
federal regulation, is, as a matter of law, a reasonably safe product. 4
The Lewis approach has the obvious advantage of simplifying litigation, but seems inconsistent with the generally accepted notion that
legislative safety standards are not conclusive evidence of due care.5"
Governmental approval also may have particular significance
for the plaintiff by providing a potential source of recovery against
the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 6 In
Griffin v. United States,5 7 the Third Circuit recently affirmed an
award against the Government for injuries the plaintiff allegedly
sustained from the ingestion of a federally approved oral polio vaccine. 8 Rejecting the Government's contention that recovery was
barred by the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the court found the Division of Biological Standards of
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare negligent in approving the vaccine absent full compliance with federal testing regulations. 9 Further, the court approved the award of $1,500,000 to
the plaintiff as not "in any way shocking, unfair or biased,"6 but
upheld the joint tort-feasor release executed by the plaintiff in favor
of the manufacturer, which reduced the judgment against the federal government by the amount of the manufacturer's pro rata
share.6
A.

Theories of Recovery

In general, plaintiffs allegedly injured from use of defendantdrug manufacturers' products have advanced three basic theories of
52. See, e.g., Sterling Drug Co. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966); Stromsodt v.
Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.D. 1966).
53. 243 Ore. 317, 413 P.2d 400 (1966) (plaintiff allegedly injured from use of MER/29);
cf., McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., Ore. , 528 P.2d 522, 534 (1974) (in
which the Oregon Supreme Court rejected the Lewis approach and followed the majority
rule).
54. 243 Ore. at 320, 413 P.2d at 404.
55. Keeton, Some ObservationsAbout the Strict Liabilityof the Maker of Prescription
Drugs: The Aftermath of MER/29, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 149, 153 (1968).
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (1970). For a discussion of the potential for recovery
against the federal government, see Merrill, supra note 46, at 70-87; Annot., 24 A.L.R. FED.
467 (1975).
57. 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'g 351 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
58. Id. at 1073.
59. Id. at 1063-69.
60. Id. at 1071, citing Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226, 1228 (3d Cir. 1972).
61. Id. at 1071-73.
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recovery-negligence, breach of implied warranty, and strict liability in tort. When a drug proves to be dangerous because it contains
impurities, 2 it was tested inadequately," or it was labeled improperly, 4 the plaintiff normally will allege and prove that the manufacturer was negligent. The more difficult problem arises when a
drug proves to be dangerous even though it was produced, without
negligence, just as the manufacturer intended.- As indicated by the
holding in Carmen v. Eli Lilly & Co.," the plaintiff will have difficulty establishing negligence when adequate warnings are given and
the drug contains no impurities. Instead, the plaintiff may seek
recovery based on breach of implied warranty of merchantability
and fitness for intended use or strict liability in tort.67
Although the plaintiff may characterize the cause of action as
one for breach of implied warranty, the courts generally have recognized that in light of the recent trend toward broader recovery for
injuries arising from defective products, the theory of strict liability
virtually has superseded the concept of implied warranty. 8 A few
courts still maintain the distinction that privity is required in a
warranty action,69 but the majority have dispensed with this requirement." The first drug case to sustain an implied warranty
action by a party not in privity with the drug manufacturer was
62. See, e.g., Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 320 (1960); see note 23 supra and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Tinnerholm v. Parke-Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), af'd
as modified, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969).
64. See, e.g., Alman Bros. Farms & Feed Mill, Inc. v. Diamond Laboratories, Inc., 437
F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1971).
65. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 S.W.L.J. 5, 14-15 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Wade].
66. 109 Ind. App. 76, 32 N.E.2d 729 (1941) (in action for death allegedly caused by
antirabies vaccine, court held that evidence established that printed pamphlet furnished by
manufacturers adequately informed deceased that paralysis and death were possible results
of the treatrent); accord, Brown v. H.K. Mulford Co., 198 Mo. App. 586, 199 S.W. 582 (1917)
(label on bottle of hog cholera vaccine contained sufficient warnings of the dangers associated
with its use). See generally Rheingold, supra note 40, at 982-83. To assess negligence in the
case of adequate warnings, the court would have to find that the drug manufacturer was
negligent in distributing the product at all, due to the unreasonable risk of harm, notwithstanding the warning. Realistically, the FDA would not approve such a drug. Id.
67. For a discussion of these two theories, see Mendel v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 25
N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969) and Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). See generally Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1103-14 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Prosser]; 13 STAN. L. REv. 645 (1961).
68. Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 432, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373
(1969).
69. See, e.g., Berry v. American Cyanamid Co., 341 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1965).

70. Id. at 16. See generally Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 39 (1961);
§ 2-318.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
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Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories,Inc.,"' in which the court,
characterizing a drug as a product for human consumption, analogized to the impure food cases in which the privity requirement first
was eliminated. 72 When privity is not compelled, the courts have
characterized the difference between warranty and strict liability in
tort as merely one of terminology and have considered the basic
elements of the two causes of action to be the same. 73 Consequently,
in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,74 the Fifth Circuit, observing that
the outcome of a products liability action, especially when drugs are
involved, did not appear to depend on which theory of recovery was
relied upon by the parties, 75 disregarded the differences between the
two approaches. The court noted that "whatever contractual trappings of warranty have not been destroyed by the citadel of privity
need not detain us," and turned instead to an examination of strict
products liability as embodied in Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.71 Section 402A subjects a seller or manufacturer
of a product sold in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous"7 7 to the ultimate consumer to liability for physical or property
harm caused thereby, even if he exercised "all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product.""8 Although phrased in terms
of "strict liability," the Restatement" does not compel the manufacturer to be an absolute insurer of the product's safety; for the
plaintiff to recover, he must prove that: (1) the product in question
was defective; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the
71. 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960). Prior to Gottsdanker,the drug cases
founded on a theory of implied warranty uniformly denied recovery to a party not in privity.
13 STAN. L. REV. 645, 646 (1961). See, e.g., Dunbrow v. Ettinger, 44 F. Supp. 763 (E.D.N.Y.
1942), Wechsler v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 198 Misc. 540, 99 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
72. 182 Cal. App. 2d at 607, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
73. Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183, 184 (D. Mont. 1970); accord,
Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121, 126 (9th Cir. 1968); Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer &
Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 432, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373 (Ct. App. 1969).
In Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965) the court noted
that the doctrine of strict liability is "hardly more than what exists under implied warranty
when stripped of the contract doctrines of privity, disclaimer, requirements of notice of
defects, and limitation through inconsistencies with express warranties." See generally Prosser, supra note 67.
74. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
75. Id. at 1271.
76. Id. A similar approach was taken in Givens v. Lederle, Docket No. 73-59 CIVTK
(S.D. Fla. 1975).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
78. Id. For a general discussion of strict liability in tort, see Keeton, ProductsLiability-Some ObservationsAbout Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1329 (1966); Noel, supra
note 51; Prosser, supra note 67; Wade, supra note 65; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort
Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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hands of the manufacturer; (3) because of the defect, the product
was unreasonably dangerous; (4) plaintiff suffered damages or was
injured; and (5) the defect was the proximate cause of the injuries
sustained. 0 As the court in Reyes8 ' pointed out, in the case of a
plaintiff allegedly injured from the use of a "defective" drug, these
five requirements may be reduced to two-that the product was
defective as marketed, and that the defect was the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injuries.12 Normally no question exists that the
plaintiff has been injured, or that the alleged defect was present at
the time the product left the hands of the manufacturer. The defect
is usually, by definition, the result of the manufacturer's dereliction. Furthermore, the Reyes court stated that the requirements
that the product be "unreasonably dangerous" and in a "defective
condition" are essentially synonymous, and thus only one must be
proved. 3
The first requirement, that the plaintiff show the product was
defective as marketed, may be satisfied in one of three ways: (1) the
product may have been manufactured imperfectly; (2) it may have
been designed improperly; or (3) it may have been labeled inadequately regarding the risks and dangers involved in the use of the
product. 4 Because of the difficulties involved in establishing that
defendant-drug manufacturer's product was defective in design,
when no impurities are present, plaintiffs have turned with increasing frequency to allegations of inadequate directions for use or insufficient warnings of the dangers." Relevant to the issue of warnings
8 Comment k recognizes
are comments j and k of the Restatement."
that given the present state of human knowledge, some products,
including vaccines, are incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. Thus a properly prepared vaccine accompanied by proper directions and warnings is neither defective nor
unreasonably dangerous, despite the risk involved, because the socially desirable results achieved through use of the drug justify its
8
marketing and make the unavoidable risk a reasonable one. 1 Comment j re-emphasizes that to prevent a drug from being unreasona80.
81.
82.
83.
of Strict
84.
(1973).
85.
86.
87.

Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id.
Id.
Id. For a discussion of the meaning of these two phrases, see Wade, On the Nature
Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 831-33 (1973).
Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 33-34
Noel, supra note 51, at 260.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Id., comment k at 353-54.
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bly dangerous, the manufacturer may be required to give warnings
concerning its use. Furthermore, if the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial segment of the population is allergic, and
the ingredient is one whose danger generally is not known, the manufacturer is required to warn against it if he knows or should know
of the presence of the ingredient and the danger involved."8 If a
warning is given, the manufacturer safely may assume that it will
89
be read and heeded.
It is obviously advantageous for the plaintiff to allege that the
drug manufacturer is strictly liable for failing to warn of the risks
inherent in the product. Once the plaintiff proves a breach of the
defendant's duty to warn, he has sustained the burden of showing
that the product was defective or unreasonably dangerous, as required by Section 402A of the Restatement." Moreover, the plaintiff
may establish his case without the necessity of expert testimony or
the preservation of physical evidence essential to establish a design
defect. And, more importantly, the plaintiff's case is much easier for
the jury to understand.'
B. Warning Cases
The most critical question encompassed by the failure-to-warn
cases is whether the defendant-drug manufacturer had a duty to
warn the plaintiff of the particular dangers. In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories,Inc. ,92 the Ninth Circuit held the manufacturer of Sabin
oral polio vaccine strictly liable for failing to warn the plaintiff of
the risks involved in taking the vaccine. The plaintiff, age thirtynine and in good health, received the Sabin oral Type III polio
vaccine at a clinic as part of a mass immunization program sponsored by the local medical society. Shortly after taking the vaccine,
the plaintiff contracted paralytic poliomyelitis and suffered paralysis from the waist down. Although the plaintiff stated claims
based on negligence, failure to warn of known dangers, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty of fitness,93 the court limited the
scope of its decision to the theory of strict liability in tort. Citing
comments 1 and k of the Restatement, the court stated that strict
liability could be avoided in this case only if the drug was marketed
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id., commentj at 353.
Id. Noel, supra note 51, at 261.
Noel, supra note 51, at 261.
Id. at 260.
399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 125.
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with full disclosure of the existence and extent of the risks involved,
so that the consumer might make a voluntary and informed choice
whether to submit himself to such risks. 4 While recognizing that the
personal risk in some cases is "so trifling in comparison with the
advantage to be gained as to be de minimis, 9'

5

the court rejected a

purely statistical approach. Instead, the court held that a warning
must be given when, "in a particular case, the risk qualitatively
(e.g., of death or major disability), as well as quantitatively, on
balance with the end sought to be achieved, is such as to call for a
true choice judgment, medical or personal."96 Based on the Surgeon
General's Reports, which recognized a danger in taking the Sabin
Type Ell vaccine," the court concluded that at the time the plaintiff
was immunized, the manufacturer had a duty to warn the consumer
of the risks involved. Failure to meet this duty rendered the drug
unreasonably dangerous, and strict liability attached to its sale in
the absence of warning.98
The California Court of Appeals took a similar approach in
Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co.," in which plaintiffs brought an

action against the manufacturer of Sabin Type I vaccine, which was
administered in a mass immunization program, after which both
plaintiffs contracted polio. Although both plaintiffs' and defendant's experts testified that it was impossible to prove that any
individual case of poliomyelitis was vaccine-induced, 0 the court
stated that the jury was not precluded from finding that the vaccine
caused plaintiffs' injuries in light of the circumstantial evidence
presented. The plaintiffs introduced testimony of their physicians
and a report of the Surgeon General's Special Advisory Committee,
which found these plaintiffs to be members of the "compatible"
group-that is, compatible with the possibility of vaccine-induced
illness.' Imposing on the defendant the duty of superior knowledge
of all possible contraindications of the vaccine, based on evidence
94. Id. at 128-29.
95. Id. at 129.
96. Id. at 129-30; see 5 SAN DIEC.O L. REV. 422 (1968).
97. 399 F.2d at 130; see notes 31-37 supra and accompanying text.
98. 399 F.2d at 130; see Curran, Mass Immunization Programs:A Special Legal Area?,
59 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 137 (Jan. 1969); 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 829 (1969).
99. 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969).
100. Id. at 436, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
101. Id., 79 Cal. Rptr. at 376. In 1964, the Surgeon General's Special Advisory Committee reviewed all cases of paralytic poliomyelitis that had occurred within 4 to 30 days following
receipt of the oral polio vaccine, and in which paralysis had not occurred sooner than 6 days
after the feeding. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, POLIOMYELITIS SURVEILLANCE, ANNUAL
SUMMARY 1972 (Oct. 1974) at 8 [hereinafter cited as CDC Summary].
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existing at the time plaintiffs were immunized, the court held that
defendant-manufacturer breached its duty to warn of the risks involved, and thus the vaccine was defective as manufactured.,2
A similar factual situation was presented in the 1974 case of
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,13 in which the plaintiffs' infant child
contracted paralytic poliomyelitis two weeks after being given the
Sabin oral polio vaccine at a public health center. Plaintiffs alleged
that the live polio virus in the vaccine caused the child's injuries,
and that the manufacturer was liable for her injuries for failing to
warn her parents of this danger."°4 The one important factual distinction in Reyes is that the child was immunized in the midst of
an epidemic outbreak of poliomyelitis in the area in which the child
0 5 The child was diagnosed
lived."
as suffering from a severe case of
paralytic poliomyelitis caused by a Type I virus, the same type that
was wild in the community at that time." 8 The defense presented a
number of expert witnesses from the various special medical and
scientific fields involved, along with depositions of federal officials
from the Bureau of Biological Standards and the Center for Disease
Control, who testified that the child's disease most probably was
caused by the wild virus. One epidemiologist estimated that the
child's risk of contracting polio naturally at that time was one in
3,000, whereas the package insert distributed with the defendant's
product estimated that the risk of contracting Type I polio from the
vaccine itself was approximately one in 5.88 million.0 7 Nevertheless,
the jury found that the child's disease was caused by the vaccine
rather than from the wild strain in the community, and furthermore, that the manufacturer was liable in the amount of $200,000
for failing to give a direct warning to the parents of the child about
the risk of contracting polio from the vaccine itself. 1 8 In fully upholding the jury's verdict,0 9 the Fifth Circuit engaged in a two-step
analysis to determine, first, whether the vaccine was so unsafe that
marketing it at all was "unreasonably dangerous per se," and, if not,
whether the vaccine had been introduced into the stream of commerce without sufficient safeguards and thus was "unreasonably
102.
103.
104.
105.
available
106.
107.
108.
109.

274 Cal. App. 2d at 441-42, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1269.
Curran, Case Summary and Comment on Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratoriesat 1 (copy
through Vanderbilt Law Review).
Id.
Id. at 1-2.
498 F.2d at 1269.
Id. at 1282.
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dangerous as marketed." 10 The court found that on balance, marketing of the product was justified, despite the danger, since although the danger that vacinees may contract polio qualitatively is
devastating, it statistically is miniscule."' With respect to the second step of its analysis, the court, citing the Restatement, stated
that mere failure to give a required warning will cause the product
to be "unreasonable dangerous as marketed. ' " 2 The court returned
to the Davis test"' and found that a sufficient "true choice judgment" existed to require that the warning be given. The court cited
three reasons in support of its holding: first, the risk was foreseeable
statistically, although unknowable individually; second, a choice, if
given, had an opportunity to be efficacious, since reasonable alternatives to taking the oral vaccine existed;"' third, public policy
favored allocating the risk of loss between members of the marketing chain, who could pass the cost on to the public in the form of
price increases."'
The most recent "warning" case is Givens v. Lederle,"6 originally heard by a federal district court in June of 1974, at which time
7
the jury returned a verdict for the defendant-drug manufacturer."
The case was retried a year later in light of Reyes, at which time
the jury reversed its earlier verdict and awarded $262,000 to the
plaintiff, who allegedly contracted polio by handling her infant's
diapers after the child had been administered an oral polio vaccine."' The drug manufacturer was held strictly liable for failing to
warn the child's physician of the risk of "contact-associated"
cases." 9 Although not a mass immunization case, the Givens deci110. Id. at 1273.
111. Id. at 1274.
112. Id. at 1275.
113. 399 F.2d at 129-30; see notes 95-96 supra and accompanying text.
114. 498 F.2d at 1294. The only possible alternative to use of the oral vaccine was the
use of the Salk killed virus vaccine. During an epidemic outbreak, the Salk vaccine probably
would not provide immediate immunization, and thus it is questionable whether a reasonable
alternative actually existed. See MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 279 (Aug. 19, 1967)
(recommending use of a monovalent oral polio vaccine).
115. 498 F.2d at 1294.
116. Docket No. 73-59-CIVTK (S.D. Fla. 1975); see The Tennessean (Nashville), June
7, 1975, at 26, col. 5. The case is presently on appeal to the Fifth Circuit. Appeal docketed
Dec. 22, 1975.
117. Interview with Hugh Nilsen Smith, Attorney for Defendant Lederle, in Clearwater,
Fla., Jan. 2, 1976.
118. The Tennessean (Nashville), June 7, 1975, at 26, col. 5.
119. Contact cases refer to those cases of paralytic illness occurring in persons with a
history of close relationships to oral polio vaccine recipients. The definition of a contact
vaccine-associated case specifies that the onset of illness shall have occurred between 4 and
60 days following feeding of the vaccine, and that the person contracting polio shall have had
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sion is important in that it holds the manufacturer liable for injuries
sustained in a "contact-associated" situation. Left unanswered is
the question whether the drug manufacturer in a mass immunization case would be liable for failing to warn the "contact," as one
of those endangered by the use of the vaccine, of the risks involved.
An even more difficult question is presented when the "contact" is
not a parent or relative of the vaccinee. Presumably in the latter
case, the drug manufacturer at most would be required to warn only
those foreseeably endangered by the use of the drug.
In summary, the cases beginning with Davis have required a
warning to the consumer to apprise him of the risks inherent in the
use of the manufacturer's product.' 21 In balancing the competing
public policy considerations of the individual's right to be informed
and the achievement of a public health objective, 12 the courts uniformly have favored the individual's privilege of making a personal
decision whether the benefits sought to be derived from use of the
drug justify assumption of the risks involved .,22 The rationale underlying this general philosophy is analogous to the rationale underlying the informed consent cases in the medical malpractice
area-that is, a person has a right to determine what will be done
with his own body.' 23 The theory itself does not seem unjust or
inequitable. The problem for the drug manufacturer, however, is
how to fulfill the duty judicially imposed upon him. 2 4
contact with the recipient of the vaccine within 50 days prior to the onset of illness. CDC
SUMMARY, supra note 101, at 9-10.
120. 5 SAN DiEc.o L. REV. 422, 425 (1968).
121. Id. at 430.
122. Id. at 425.
123. For a discussion of the informed consent theory, see Alsobrook, Informed Consent:
A Right to Know, 40 INS. COUNSEL J. 580 (1973). The more recent opinions speak of the
doctrine of informed consent in terms of the patient's right to know of the risks involved in a
specific procedure. Under this interpretation, the patient's substantive right is not based on
any duty imposed on the physician by the medical community. Instead, the court views the
right as a natural corollary to the proposition that all normal adults have the right to determine the disposition of their own body. Id. at 584, citing Hunter v. Brown, 4 Wash. App. 899,
484 P.2d 1162 (1971); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant,
8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
124. One exception to this general rule that traditionally has been recognized by the
courts is that a manufacturer may not have a duty to warn the idiosyncratic, allergic, or
hypersensitive user. Rheingold, supra note 40, at 1003. See generally Noel, supra note 51, at
289-98. In general, for the plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer had a duty to warn of the
allergenic propensities of his product, he must show that a substantial number of users will
suffer an allergic reaction. 17 LoYoLA L. REv. 221, 222 (1970); see, e.g., Braun v. Roux Distrib.
Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958). This theory is consistent with § 402A, comment j,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, (1965), which imposes a duty to warn of ingredients "to
which a substantialnumber of the population are allergic ..
"(Emphasis added). Because
the decisions, as evidenced by the Davis holding, have rejected a blind adherence to statistical
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(1)

Warning to the Ultimate Consumer

One aspect of the courts' holdings causing particular practical
problems for the drug manufacturers is the requirement that the
warnings must run to those the manufacturer should expect to use
the product, or be endangered by its probable use.1 2s This poses
immense practical problems for the drug companies who do not sell
to, do not advertise to, or do not directly communicate with the
ultimate consumer.12 Nonetheless, the requirement is in keeping
with general products liability law, which requires a warning to the
intended or foreseeable consumer, even when an intermediary exists
in the chain of distribution.' 2 The reasoning in these cases often is
that it is foreseeable to the manufacturer that the intermediary may
fail to discover and correct a defect or to pass on a warning.' 28 An
exception, however, is made in products cases in which the intermediary is not a mere conduit of the product, but administers or recommends it on an individual basis, implying an independent duty
to evaluate the risks and transmit the relevant warnings to the

consumer. 129
Accordingly, the law generally imposes a duty on the manufacturer of non-prescription drugs to use reasonable care in warning
probabilities and have demanded instead a consideration of the gravity of the potential harm,
recent cases demonstrate a trend of requiring a warning whenever the manufacturer is aware
of the possibility that his drug may cause a harmful reaction in even a small group of users.
Rheingold, supra note 40, at 1005; 17 LOYOLA L. REv. at 226. See generally Schattman, A
Cause of Action for the Allergic Consumer, 8 HOUSTON L. REv. 827 (1971). Nevertheless, the
manufacturer will be required to warn only of those dangers of which he has knowledge, or,
in the exercise of reasonable skill and foresight, he should have knowledge. Cudmore v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003
(1967). The key to this latter requirement is foreseeability, since the court will not impose
liability for drug reactions so unique that the harmful results could not reasonably have been
foreseen by the manufacturer. Id.; accord, Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1278
(5th Cir. 1974); Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash. 2d 347, 358, 378 P.2d 298, 304-05 (1963).
In such unpredictable cases, even if a warning was given, it might prove meaningless because
frequently neither the consumer nor his physician would be able to recognize the peculiar
reaction in advance. Merrill, supra note 46, at 24-25. When a warning is required, however,
the duty is directed to an ascertainable and foreseeable class of persons possessing the particular allergy in question. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968). These
cases, involving the allergic or idiosyncratic plaintiff, may be distinguished from the vaccine
cases and other drug cases in which the risk in some degree affects all or a significant portion
of those who use the drug. Id. In the vaccine cases, the duty to warn is directed to the entire
class of ultimate consumers.
125. Noel, supra note 51, at 281.
126. Curran, supra note 98.
127. Rheingold, supra note 40, at 986.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Stottlemire v. Cawood, 213 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1963); Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960).
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consumers of the drugs' risks. In contrast, the manufacturer of prescription drugs must use reasonable care to warn the consumer's
physician of the drug's risks, since the physician acts as a learned
intermediary between the manufacturer and the patient.'30 The
court in Davis recognized that a warning to the medical profession
in such cases is the only effective way in which a warning could help
the patient, since the physician is able to assess the risks in light of
his knowledge of his patient's needs and susceptibilities.' 3' Furthermore, the manufacturer may have extreme difficulty in reaching the
consumer with a warning.'3 2 The problem arises, however, when a
prescription drug, such as a polio vaccine, is not dispensed on a
personalized basis. Rather, in the mass immunization cases, courts
presume that the vaccine is administered to all comers at mass
clinics without an individualized balancing of the risks by a
"learned intermediary."' 133 The Ninth Circuit in Davis held that
when no individualized medical judgment intervenes between the
manufacturer of a prescription drug and the ultimate consumer, "it
is the responsibility of the manufacturer to see that warnings reach
the consumer, either by giving warning itself or by obligating the
purchaser to give warning."' 34 The court reasoned that in such a
case, the very justification for the prescription drug evaporates. 135
130. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); Davis v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968); Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 394, 38
Cal. Rptr. 183, 192 (1964); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969), af'g
263 F. Supp. 159 (D.S.D. 1967).
131. Query whether warnings to a physician are really effective. In order to be effective,
warnings and instructions must be carefully read and understood by the physician. But
pharmaceutical companies spend over $3,000 a year per physician to promote their products,
and thus drug advertising becomes a means of distorting the balance between risks and
benefits. Furthermore, a drug's official labeling is required only to accompany the package
distributed to the pharamacist and thus may never even reach the physician himself. Merrill,
supra note 46, at 26. This problem arose in Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th
Cir. 1969), a suit against the drug manufacturer for permanent eye injury sustained by
plaintiff as a result of the manufacturer's alleged failure to warn plaintiff's doctor of the side
effects of its prescription drug Aralen. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings that plaintiff's physician (and other general practitioners) receive so much literature on
drugs that it is impossible to read it all; that plaintiff's physician relied on "detail men,"
medical conventions, medical journals, and conversations with other doctors for information
on drugs he prescribed; and, that a change in literature and an additional letter were insufficient to present new information to him. Id. at 990. Rather, the court found that the most
efficient means of presenting drug information to doctors entails the use of "detail men," who
should have been informed of the change in information and should have brought this to the
doctor's attention. Id. at 993.
132. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968).
133. Id. at 131; accord, Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.
1974).
134. 399 F.2d at 131.
135. Id.; see 36 Mo. L. REv. 570, 575-76 (1971), in which the author points out that if

1976]

MASS IMMUNIZATION CASES

The Fifth Circuit in Reyes adopted this holding in rejecting the
defendant's argument that its warning to the State Health Department was sufficient. The court concluded that just as the manufacturer cannot balance the risks and benefits of a given medication for
its ultimate consumers, it cannot allow its immediate purchaser to
make this choice for them.136 Likewise, in Davis, the defendant
argued that its duty to warn was satisfied by its disclosure of the
dangers to the medical society dispensing the vaccines through a
printed insert accompanying each bottle of vaccine. 37 The court
disagreed, finding that when drugs are sold over the counter, warnings normally can be given by proper labeling, but such a method
of warning is not available in the mass immunization setting where
the bottles and inserts are never seen by the consumer. 38 Instead,
the court recognized that other means of communications such as
"advertisements, posters, releases to be read and signed by recipients of the vaccine, or oral warnings" were available and could have
been undertaken or prescribed by the drug manufacturer to reach
39
the ultimate consumer.
Whether a valid distinction can be drawn between prescription
drugs administered by a physician and those administered through
a public health clinic is questionable. In a well-designed public
health program, a doctor normally has investigated thoroughly all
risks involved in the use of the vaccine, has taken all possible preventative measures to guard against mishap, and has trained specially those working in the clinic to administer the particular vaccine. Compare this situation to that of the general practitioner who
deals with a countless number of drugs in treating numerous diseases, and who cannot possibly specialize in the administration of
one particular kind of vaccine. Furthermore, just as the physician
generally does not inform the patient that the risk of contracting
polio from the ingestion of the oral vaccine is one in several million,
because he considers the benefits to far outweigh the potential
harm, the doctor or medical society conducting the public health
program likewise makes a deliberative and informed decision that
the risks are not significant enough to justify their disclosure. Thus
medical supervision and individualized judgment seem no less prescourts did not require a warning to consumers in the mass immunization cases, they would
be in the anomalous position of requiring a warning to consumers for non-prescription drugs,
but not requiring one for certain prescription drugs.
136. 498 F.2d at 1276.
137. 399 F.2d at 130.
138. Id. at 131.
139. Id.
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ent in the public health clinic than in the practitioner's office; consequently, contrary to present case law, a warning to the doctor or
medical society conducting the immunization program should satisfy the manufacturer's duty to warn. 4 '
(2)

Method and Adequacy of Warning

The court in the Davis case took a positive step toward providing guidance to the drug manufacturer by indicating that the use
of advertisements, posters, releases, and oral warnings might provide sufficient notice to the consumer to satisfy the manufacturer's
obligation. The opinion, however, does not indicate whether the use
of one, a combination, or all of the devices mentioned would be
required by the court to absolve the manufacturer of liability,'4 ' and
subsequent decisions fail to offer any specific guidance. In general,
the warning must be accurate, strong, clear, and placed in a sufficiently prominent position that it readily will be noticed., The
manufacturer is aided by the presumption set forth in comment j
to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,'4 3 that if the
manufacturer has warned of the risks by the use of literature or by
other means, he reasonably may assume that the protected class has
read and will heed the warning given. Furthermore, Section 388 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts' requires only the exercise of
reasonable care on the part of the manufacturer to inform the consumer of the dangers, rather than mandating actual notice. '
Not only is the drug manufacturer confronted with the problem
of the manner in which to convey a warning, but, additionally, he
is faced with the problem of what information must be contained
in the warning. This is a particularly arduous task for the drug
manufacturer, a member of the private economy, accustomed to
thinking primarily in terms of sales in a competitive marketplace.'41
Under the present case law, the manufacturer is expected to convey
information to the consuming public regarding the risks, benefits,
140.

Interview with Dr. William Schaffner, Assoc. Prof., Dept. of Med., Preventive

Med., Vanderbilt Univ. Med. School, in Nashville, Tenn., Jan. 19, 1976.
141. 36 Mo. L. REV. 570, 575 (1971).
142. 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 829, 835 (1969).
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment j, at 353 (1965).
144. Id. § 388.
145. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 991-92 (8th Cir. 1969), in which
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that the "undisputed standard" of duty
to warn requires "reasonable efforts to warn the medical profession of the side effects of the
drug."
146.

5 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 422, 430 (1968).
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and contraindications of his product."' A delicate balance must be
struck among these factors. Minimization of the dangers through
watered-down warnings or warnings containing false assurances of
safety may amount to inadequate warnings altogether, resulting in
manufacturer liability.' As a general rule, the force of the warnings
must be equal to the dangers involved, sufficient to raise an appropriate caution in the user.'49 Additionally, a warning may be found
deficient because of the use of technical terms, incomprehensible to
the ultimate consumer to whom the warning is aimed.'50 Yet, in the
medical field, the use of such technical terms seems almost unavoidable. The question of the adequacy of the warnings ordinarily is a
question of fact for the jury,' 5 ' which automatically adds another
element of unpredictability to the manufacturer's already uncertain
task.
(3) Manufacturer Held to Skill of an Expert
An additional problem is presented for the manufacturer by the
fact that the courts hold him to the skill of an expert in his field and
presume that he possesses an expert's knowledge of the arts, materials, and processes of the pharmaceutical industry.'5 2 Included in
such expertise must be a familiarity with the practices of distribution and administration of pharmaceutical products in the drug
industry.'5 3 Thus the court in Reyes rejected the manufacturer's
contention that he had no knowledge that the vaccine would not be
administered as a prescription drug and, based on expert testimony,
concluded that the drug manufacturer had ample reason to foresee
the way in which its vaccine would be distributed.'54 Because the
drug manufacturer often sells to drug distribution houses, which
then sell to the public health clinics or pharamacists, the only procedure for insuring that warnings reach the ultimate consumer is to
147.

See Curran, Public Warnings of the Risk in Oral Polio Vaccine, 65 AM. J. OF PUB.
(May 1975).

HEALTH 501

148.

Rheingold, supra note 40, at 994.

149.
150.

18 DE PAUL L. REV. 829, 835 (1969).
Noel, supra note 51, at 283.

151.

Id.

152. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1277 (5th Cir. 1974); accord, Wright
v. Carter Prod., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957); Johnston v. Upjohn Co., 442 S.W.2d 93 (Mo.
App. 1969).
153. 498 F.2d at 1277.
154. Id. Neal Nathanson, Professor of Epidemiology at Johns Hopkins University
School of Public Health, testified that it was common knowledge in the drug industry that
"a great majority" of vaccines are distributed at mass immunization clinics, manned at least
in part by volunteers.
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treat all drugs as intended for the public health clinics, since warnings on package inserts to the pharmacist and physician will not
discharge the manufacturer's duty to warn the ultimate consumer.
Moreover, the manufacturer sometimes argues that the product involved a hazard of which he was unaware. The courts have held,
however, that the duty to warn arises not only when the manufacturer actually knows of the danger, but also when, in the exercise
of reasonable care, he should know of the danger.'5 5 As a corollary
to the duty to know the nature and effect of the product, the courts
have imposed a duty on the manufacturer to use reasonable efforts
to investigate to discover this information.'56 In Davis, the Ninth
Circuit stated that when the Sabin Type III vaccine initially was
licensed and produced, the manufacturer was under no duty to warn
because there was no known or foreseeable risk involved in taking
the drug. But, when the danger became apparent after further experience, a duty to warn attached. 157 Consequently, even after producing and marketing a product, the manufacturer is obliged to keep
abreast of new scientific and medical developments of relevance to
his drug, and to apply new investigative techniques as they are
developed.'58 In Tinnerholm v. Parke-Davis& Co.,'"'the drug manufacturer was held negligent in failing to send out warnings to foreseeable users of new developments regarding the harmful side effects
produced by its drug. 6 ' Likewise, the court in Stromsodt v. ParkeDavis & Co."'6 found the manufacturer liable for injuries caused by
use of its drug on the basis of its failure to warn of dangers that were
inherent in its use and that could have been discovered by adequately testing the product, even though the drug manufacturer
met all of the government regulations and requirements in production and marketing.8 2 Thus while the duty to discover is a relative
one, in which the manufacturer only need show that he adhered to
scientifically accepted tests and standards currently practiced by
manufacturers of like products, the courts have demanded a higher
155. Noel, supra note 51, at 265; see, e.g., Tinnerholm v. Parke-Davis & Co., 285 F.
Supp. 432, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd as modified, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969); Stromsodt v.
Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D.N.D. 1966), af'd, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969).
156. Rheingold, supra note 40, at 996-98.
157. 399 F.2d at 129.
158. Rheingold, supra note 40, at 997. But see Gielskie v. State, 10 App. Div. 2d 471,
200 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1960), rev'g 18 Misc. 2d 508, 191 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1959), aff'd,
9 N.Y.2d 834, 216 N.Y.S.2d 85, 175 N.E.2d 455 (1961).
159. 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
160. Id. at 451.
161. 257 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.D. 1966).
162. Id. at 996-97.
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degree of testing than with other products because the danger associated with drugs is so acute.'63 As the decision in Stromsodt illustrated, compliance with stringent FDA regulations and standards
will not constitute due care per se.6 4 But, as the court in Johnston
v. Upjohn Co.' 5 indicated, no liability will attach if the failure to
detect the danger occurred because it was unknown and due to
undetectable factors.
C.

Causation

Once the plaintiff has established that the product was in a
"defective condition, unreasonably dangerous" to the ultimate consumer because of the manufacturer's failure to warn, he still has the
burden of proving that the alleged defect was the proximate cause
of his injuries. 6' Since, in all other products liability suits, the plaintiff must show that the defect in issue caused his injury, arguably a
plaintiff in a "warning" case must prove that he would have suffered
no harm but for the absence of the warning."7 This question was
addressed by the Fifth Circuit in Reyes, which recognized that in
most products cases there are two causation issues: first, whether
the defendant's product was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries and secondly, whether plaintiffs injuries resulted from the alleged defect in defendant's product." 8 The jury initially found that
the child's poliomyelitis was vaccine-induced, and thus defendant's
product was the "producing-cause." The more critical issue was
whether the manufacturer's failure to warn of the danger inherent
in its product could be regarded as the proximate cause of the
child's injuries. The Reyes court set forth the following test to determine proximate cause:
Where a consumer, whose injury the manufacturer should have reasonably
foreseen, is injured by a product sold without a required warning, a rebuttable
presumption will arise that the consumer would have read any warning provided by the manufacturer, and acted so as to minimize the risks. In the
absence of evidence rebutting the presumption, a jury finding that the defen163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Rheingold, supra note 40, at 998.
257 F. Supp. at 996-97.
442 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. App. 1969).
See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
50 TEXAS L. REV. 577, 578 (1972).

168. 498 F.2d at 1279; accord, Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991, 997
(D.N.D. 1966). Note that in Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 369 (1969), the court addressed only the issue of whether the injury was vaccineinduced, without deciding whether defendant's failure to warn was the cause-in-fact of the
plaintiffs' injuries. Id. at 374. See generally Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacyof
Information, 48 TExAs L. REV. 398, 413-15 (1970).
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dant's product was the producing cause of the plaintiffs injury would be
sufficient to hold him liable.'69

The court reasoned that testimony by the child's parents about
what they would have done if proper warnings had been given would
be merely self-serving and speculative. To avoid this, the court created a legal presumption that a warning, had it been given, would
have been heeded. 170 This holding is in accord with holdings in other
products liability cases. In Technical Chemical Co. v. Jacobs,'7' the
Texas Supreme Court held that it was "incumbent" upon the plaintiff to secure a jury finding that the alleged faulty labeling was the
cause of his injuries. 172 The court, however, established a rebuttable
presumption that the warning, if given, would have been read, noting that in most warning cases the plaintiff's own testimony usually
would be the only proof that the plaintiff could present to show that
he would have heeded a warning. The court observed that, at best,
this merely would lead to a swearing match between the plaintiff
and defendant, with liability depending on the sympathies of the
jury; at worst, the plaintiff would be unable to testify because of
death or injury, and the burden would be impossible to sustain. 73
The court noted, however, that this presumption of causation may
be rebutted if the defendant can show that the plaintiff misused the
product in an outrageous manner, or that the plaintiff knew of the
risks at the time of using the product. 74 Recovery, however, is insured when jurors could only speculate whether the plaintiff would
have heeded a warning had one been given and thus avoided the
75
accident.
Although the legal presumption regarding causation created by
the court in Reyes accords with general products liability law, a
distinction arguably should be drawn between the two. In most
products liability cases, when a warning has been given, the con169. 498 F.2d at 1281.
170. Id.
171. 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972), rev'g 472 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). This case
involved an action by the buyer of a can of freon coolant against the manufacturer for injuries
sustained when the can exploded because plaintiff mistakenly had attempted to put the
coolant in the wrong side of the car's air conditioner. Plaintiff based his cause of action on §
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and alleged that the manufacturer was negligent
in failing to warn of this danger. Because the plaintiff testified that he had not read the can's
label, the jury found that the manufacturer's faulty labeling was not the cause of the plaintiff's injuries. See 50 TExAs L. REV. 577, 578 (1972).
172. 480 S.W.2d at 605.
173. Id. at 606.
174. 50 TEXAs L. REv. 577, 580-81 (1972).
175. Id. at 583.
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sumer has a choice of using or not using the product; when a warning has not been given, the consumer is unable to assess the risks
involved; consequently, the court presumes that he would not have
used the product had he been aware of the risks. In a vaccination
case, however, often no true choice exists whether or not a warning
has been given. For a child entering public school for the first time,
state statutes generally require a polio immunization,'76 and for an
individual immunized during an epidemic outbreak of poliomyelitis
no other safe and effective alternative exists.'7 7 Thus, in the vaccination cases, often the presumption that the plaintiff would have
heeded a warning had one been given is a legal fiction, erroneously
applied by the courts. Instead of engaging in such a presumption,
the courts more appropriately should leave the burden of proof on
the plaintiff to show specifically why he would not have taken the
vaccine if confronted with an adequate warning.
IV.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

An analysis of the "mass immunization" cases reveals that the
manufacturer of a pure unadulterated vaccine may be held strictly
liable for failing to warn the ultimate consumer of the dangers inherent in the use of the drug. Pervading these cases is the strong public
policy issue of whether these warnings should be given at all because
of their potential threat to the nation's preventative medicine programs that favor mass immunization to combat infectious diseases.' 8 The American Academy of Pediatrics and the Conference
of State and Territorial Epidemiologists filed amici curiae briefs in
Reyes, arguing that warnings should not be given because, first, any
effort to warn vaccinees will be futile and frightening, leading only
to confusion, and, secondly, a warning is unnecessary once epidemiologists reach a deliberate medical judgment that universal vaccination is necessary.' 9 The courts, in balancing this public policy
issue against the right of the individual to be informed, seemingly
have resolved this question in favor of the latter. Therefore, unless
a radical shift occurs in future cases, the manufacturer must seek a
workable solution to fulfill the warning requirement if he is to avoid
further liability.
At first glance, the solution appears both simple and obvious-simply provide the consumer with the requisite warning.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See note 32 supra.
See note 114 supra.
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1293 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id.
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The practicalities of accomplishing this task, however, involve significant problems because the manufacturer ordinarily has no direct
contact with the consumer. Perhaps, as suggested by Davis,'8 the
manufacturer could try to insure that the consumer was warned by
selling only to those "distributors" who guaranteed that the warnings would be communicated to the consumer and signed an indemnification agreement, promising indemnification for any losses sustained by the manufacturer for failure to warn. The guarantee, in
and of itself, probably would provide only slight legal comfort to the
manufacturer because the general rule in products liability cases is
that it is foreseeable to the manufacturer that the distributorintermediary might fail to pass on a warning. Thus the courts have
imposed the more stringent duty of requiring the warning to reach
the ultimate consumer.' 8' In combination with an indemnification
agreement, however, the guarantee might entitle the drug manufacturer to indemnification from the distributor, who failed to pass on
the warning. If the negligent distributor were a drug distribution
house, the manufacturer might be able to recover. On the other
hand, if the distributor were a public health clinic, the indemnification agreement would prove of little value since many health clinics,
supported by contributions and volunteer workers, would be financially unable to indemnify the manufacturer for a loss of the magnitude exemplified by past jury awards. 82' Moreover, even if a warning
is given, the manufacturer may be found liable for inadequately
representing the dangers in a manner comprehensible to the consumer. Also since the adequacy of a warning is a question of fact for
the jury, the manufacturer may be faced with incongruous standards from state to state."'3
In light of the seeming impracticalities for the manufacturer in
complying with the requirements of present case law, an initial
question raised by the decisions is whether the courts should impose
strict liability on the manufacturer of a pure drug"8 4 or whether they
should return to a negligence standard. The traditional justifications advanced for the imposition of strict liability are twofold: to
provide incentive for greater care on the part of the manufacturer
and to allocate the risk of loss to the manufacturer who is better able
to absorb losses.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See text accompanying note 134 supra.
See text accompanying note 128 supra.
See note 3 supra.
Merrill, supra note 46, at 50.
Rheingold, supra note 40, at 1014-15. See generally Wade, supra note 83, at 826.
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First, the imposition of a rigorous rule of liability often is justified on the basis that it will produce greater care on the part of the
manufacturer. Normally, the manufacturer is in the best position
to discover defects or dangers in his product and to guard against
85
them through appropriate safeguards, inspections, and warnings.'
A significant increase in care, however, will result only if the manufacturer presently is not exercising the highest practicable standard
of care.'" In this regard, vaccines and other types of prescription
drugs would seem least to fit this rationale because of the numerous
factors that already require a high standard of care on the part of
the manufacturers.'87 These factors include exceedingly strict governmental requirements and supervision, ' internal production controls and a tradition of absolute purity in the drugs manufactured, 8' stiff competition in the industry and concern for reputation,"'9 and imposition of liability for negligence.' 9 ' Conceivably, the
imposition of strict liability may lead to a higher standard of care,
but only at the expense of more deleterious consequences. Strict
liability may discourage the expeditious marketing of new and vitally necessary drugs while further testing and experimentation are
conducted."12 Additionally, basic research may be stifled if the drug
companies determine that the risks in marketing a new drug are too
great to justify the expenditure necessary to develop and produce
the drug." 3
Secondly, the imposition of strict liability has been justified by
the theory of "loss distribution," "risk allocation," or "enterprise
liability," in which accidents and injuries are considered as an inevitable and statistically foreseeable "cost" of the product's consumption or use."' According to this theory, strict liability places the risk
of loss on the manufacturers, who are in a better financial position
than the injured parties to absorb the losses or distribute them
among consumers."' Theoretically, the manufacturer will increase
185. Hall v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
186. 13 STAN. L. REV. 645, 646 (1961).
187. Rheingold, supra note 40, at 1015.
188. Id.; 13 STAN. L. REV. at 647.
189. Rheingold, supra note 40, at 1015.
190. Id.; 13 STAN. L. REV. at 647.
191. Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 34
(1973); Rheingold, supra note 40, at 1015; 13 STAN. L. REv. at 647.
192. Rheingold, supra note 40, at 1017; 13 STAN. L. REV. at 649.
193. 13 STAN. L. REV. at 649.
194. Hall v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
For a discussion of risk allocation see Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and
the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
195. 13 STAN. L. REV. at 648; see, Dickerson, The Basis of Strict ProductsLiability, 1962
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his prices to reflect the cost of improvements, liability insurance,
and excessive damage recoveries, as will his competitors within the
industry."' Often, however, a drug manufacturer is unable to make
19 7
further improvements or to obtain adequate insurance coverage.
Furthermore, the distribution of liability costs among faultless drug
manufacturers seems merely fortuitous, and thus, if a manufacturer, bludgeoned with an inordinate amount of liability, increased
his prices accordingly he would be driven out of the competitive
market-place and potentially into bankruptcy.'9 8 Instead of spreading the risk of loss to the consumer, the imposition of strict liability
may result in the drug manufacturer alone bearing the loss.
Consequently, the traditional justifications advanced for the
imposition of strict liability in most products liability cases seem
inapplicable to the drug manufacturer's liability in the mass immunization cases. Rather, negligence seems to provide a more appropriate and equitable standard, imposing liability only when the
manufacturer is to some degree at fault. Under a negligence theory,
the plaintiff would be denied recovery if the manufacturer had exercised all due care in the production and distribution of his product.
Considering the recent trend toward broader recovery in products
liability cases, it is unlikely that the courts will revert to this less
stringent standard.
Faced with the burden of strict liability, the drug manufacturer's more timely and practicable solution may be to try to shift
the risk of loss to another party. The practical problems of placing
the risk of loss on the drug manufacturer already have been explored. It would seem unjust for the consumer to bear the cost of
adverse reactions caused by drugs that not only have been federally
approved for use, but also, as in the case of polio vaccines, have been
required to be administered by state statute."' As a general proposiINS. L.J. 7, 11 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Dickerson].

196. Dickerson, supra note 195, at 11.
197. Cf. Teff, supra note 46, at 113-14, stating that the drug companies, because of their
high profit ratios, should be able to insure against all but the most catastrophic losses. There
is a problem, however, when the manufacturer seeks to insure against losses caused by new
drugs because the actuarial process necessarily operates with reference to the past. Thus it
may be prohibitively expensive to insure against some drug risks, if indeed they are insurable
at all.
198. 13 STAN. L. Rav. at 648 n.22. Professor Keeton adds several other lesser justifications for the impositon of strict liability including: (1) it provides a means of recovery in cases
in which fault is difficult or impossible to prove, thus giving a deserving plaintiff recovery;
(2) it provides redress for the frustration of consumer expectations. Keeton, supra note 191,
at 34-35.
199. Krugman, Immunization "Dyspractice":The Need for "No Fault" Insurance, 56
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tion, the mass immunization cases have adhered to this philosophy.
Furthermore, of all the parties involved, the consumer can least
afford to bear the loss financially. 00° The consumer is in the worst
position to reduce the risk of injury by altering his own behavior
since with few exceptions, he does not decide whether to purchase
or use a prescription drug and, ordinarily, he is neither provided
with the information nor is he equipped to understand the type of
201
information essential to safe drug use.
Perhaps the risk of loss for adverse reactions to vaccines, whose
use have been federally approved and statutorily required, most
appropriately should be allocated to the Government. 2 2 The possibility of recovery under the Federal Torts Claims Act has been
expanded substantially since the Griffin decision. 2 3 To recover
under the Act, however, the plaintiff must prove that his injury was
caused "by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
of employment .. .. ,,21
Furthermore, the Act is riddled with a series of exceptions that could limit the Government's potential liability.2 15 Thus numerous obstacles face a plaintiff seeking to recover
against the federal government.
A more certain method of placing the risk of loss on the Government probably is through a statutory enactment requiring direct
compensation to the injured party by the federal government, without regard to proof of negligence.2 0 Since society appears to benefit
from these mass immunization programs, as evidenced by the drastic decline in paralytic poliomyelitis, ' then society logically should
bear the loss, through the Government, for injuries that occur without fault. 20 8 Other countries, such as Denmark, Germany, and
Japan, have enacted legislation to compensate those who are victims of the immunization laws. 2 9 The United States Government
already has aided the polio vaccination campaign by granting funds
to the states enabling all children, regardless of their ability to pay,
PEDIATRIcs 159 (Aug. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Krugman]; see note 32 supra and accompanying text.
200. Merrill, supra note 46, at 87-88.
201. Id. at 90-91, 93.
202. See notes 32 & 49 supra and accompanying text.
203. See notes 56-61 supra and accompanying text.
204. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
205. Merrill, supra note 46, at 71-73.
206. 13 STAN. L. REv. 645, 651 (1961).

207. See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
208. Krugman, supra note 199, at 159.
209. Id.
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to receive an immunization. 21 0 This federal aid should be extended
to compensate the victims of immunization programs through legislation analogous to the Price-Anderson Amendment to the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954,21 which provides compensation to the victims
of catastrophic accidents arising out of nuclear reactions. 212 A similar statute could provide direct compensation to individuals, immunized as part of a government program, for injuries allegedly sustained because of the vaccine. 2 3 Additionally, a government agency,
similar to the Workmen's Compensation Board, could carry out
such a program. The necessary funds could be raised by allocating
tax funds to the programs or by placing a minimal surcharge on
each dose of vaccine manufactured." 4 The legislation would serve
the dual goals of providing prompt and adequate compensation to
the public, without lengthy litigation, and of safeguarding the man21
ufacturers against losses beyond the limit of available insurance. 1
An alternative solution would be legislation requiring government indemnification of manufacturers for liability above the limit
of available private insurance. 21 This method would protect manufacturers from devastating damage awards, yet ensure plaintiffs'
recoveries. As a prerequisite to obtaining a license to produce the
vaccine, manufacturers would be required to secure a certain
amount of insurance or demonstrate the availability of an equal
amount of assets." 7 Although this alternative possesses the drawback of requiring litigation to determine the manufacturer's liability, it has the advantage of spreading the cost first to those primarily
benefitted by defendant's product, the consumers who pay higher
prices to cover the cost of insurance premiums, and, secondly, to the
218
taxpayers in the case of extraordinary losses.
The imposition of liability on the Government should be limited to those cases in which the Government actively has engaged
in a federal health care program requiring the administration of a
particular drug. Usually in such cases, as was true with the polio
vaccine, the development and distribution of the drug is so much a
210. 13 STAN. L. REV. 645, 651 n.39 (1961), citing Poliomyelitis Immunization Assistance Act of 1955, ch. 863, 69 Stat. 704 (1955).
211. Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256.
212.

See ROSENTHAL, KORN, & LUBMAN,

CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENTS IN GOVERNMENT

PROGRAMS 2-3 (1963) [hereinafter cited as ROSENTHAL].
213. 13 STAN. L. REV. at 651, citing such a proposal that was made to benefit those
injured by the Salk vaccine, H.R. 8082, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
214. Krugman, supra note 199, at 160.
215. ROSENTHAL, supra note 212, at 12.
216. Id. at 15.
217. Id. at 16.
218. 13 STAN. L. REV. at 652.
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cooperative venture between government and industry219 that imposition of at least partial liability on the Government does not seem
inequitable. Although government liability arguably may lead to a
lesser standard of care by the manufacturers,2 ° this problem can be
avoided by disallowing compensation or indemnification if the manufacturer has been negligent, or has failed to comply with more
stringent regulations that the FDA could promulgate.
Although government liability seems to provide the most workable and equitable solution to the problems presented by the mass
immunization cases, it does not provide an immediate solution for
the manufacturer since it requires the enactment of new legislation,
which is always a time-consuming process. In the meantime, the
most practical solution for the drug manufacturers is to attempt to
comply with the present case law. To insure freedom from liability,
they may "overwarn" of the dangers inherent in the drug through
posters, written bulletins, and advertisements at the health clinics.
Before selling to any distributors, the manufacturer could demand
a contractual undertaking on their part to disseminate these warnings to the patients at the clinics, as well as an indemnification
agreement to compensate the manufacturer for liability resulting
from failure to warn. In addition, the manufacturer might require
each consumer to sign a release, agreeing not to hold the manufacturer liable for any drug-related injuries not attributable to his negligence in producing the drug.2 2' Although these procedures may
appear both troublesome and inadequate, presently they seem the
only immediate solution to the manufacturer's dilemma.
V.

CONCLUSION

The incidence of paralytic poliomyelitis has declined remarkably in the United States since the development of the inactivated
Salk vaccine and, later, of the attenuated Sabin oral vaccine. The
219. Merrill, supra note 46, at 102 n.375.
220. Id. at 106.
221. Releases, with a printed warning at the top, presently are being used by many
health clinics, and even are disseminated in various foreign languages in an attempt to reach
all participants at the clinics. In Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,the plaintiffs signed a release
in favor of the State of Texas. 498 F.2d 1264, 1270 (5th Cir. 1974). For a general discussion of
the requirements for, and effect of, a release, see 66 AM. JuR. 2d, Release §§ 1-45 (1973). In
general, a releasor cannot avoid the effect of a release on the ground that at the time he signed
the release he did not read it or know its contents, nor on the ground that he could not read
English. Blossi v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 144 Iowa 697, 123 N.W. 360 (1909). The releasor,
however, may be able to avoid the release if he can show ignorance of the nature of the
instrument, or mutual mistake regarding the nature or seriousness of the injury. Ricketts v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946); Warren y. Crockett, 211 Tenn. 173, 364
S.W.2d 352 (1962).
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use of the oral vaccine has been remarkable for its high degree of
safety, and in the United States only a small number of incidents
of polio have been associated with the administration of the vaccine.222 Nevertheless, the cases arising from these incidents have
caused great concern and dissatisfaction among manufacturers of
the vaccines. To ensure continued freedom from this dread disease,
however, regular immunization of all children is essential. This
immunization program can be accomplished only if the necessary
vaccines are available. If the courts continue to extend strict liability to the manufacturers of pure, unadulterated drugs administered
in mass immunization programs, promoted by the federal government, governmental assistance may be the only assurance of maintaining the expeditious production of the vaccines. To ensure the
continued success of the nation's preventative health care programs,
it is hoped that governmental aid soon will be forthecoming.
MARY ELIZABETH MANN
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